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Alternative (Low Tax) Budget for 2005 
Georgi Angelov 
 
. Summary 
or the second time the Institute for Market 
conomics prepared an alternative government 
udget. In the 2005 alternative budget we 
nvisage revenues totaling 34.5% of GDP (39% 
n the government draft) and expenditures 
mounting to 32.8% of GDP (39.3% in the 
overnment draft). The main reforms supporting 
he budget are: 
 10% flat rate for all direct taxes – 
orporate tax, income tax, social security tax 
 Public expenditure cuts – through decrease 
f public sector staff, optimization of the 
aintenance expenditures, decrease of the 
ubsidies for loss-making activities, reducing the 
nefficient meddling in the labor market, transfer 
f activities to the private sector and faster 
rivatization. 
 Using the budget surpluses for pension 
eform (privatization of the pension system), 
apitalization of the social security and other 
tructural reforms. 
s a result of the 10% flat tax rate: 
 The taxation of the companies and 
ndividuals will be cut by half 
 The incentives for work, entrepreneurship, 
isk-taking, saving and investment will increase 
 The distortions, caused by the taxation will 
ecrease (deadweight loss) 
• The economic development will be faster 
and the wealth will increase 
•  The incentives for tax avoidance and tax 
evasion will diminish as well as the gray 
economy 
• The net incomes of the taxpayers will 
increase by 30-40% 
In addition to that, we propose a 3-year budget 
reform, including additional reforms for 2006 
and 2007: 
• Zero corporate tax 
• Private competitive health funds and 
hospitals, pension reform, voucher system in the 
education 
• Program budgeting, continuing reduction of 
the public service staff and the subsidies 
The proposed reforms will ensure a stable 
double-digit economic growth and 
corresponding rapid increase of the incomes of 
Bulgarian citizens. In addition, the reforms will 
increase the efficiency of the public spending 
and the quality of the public services, healthcare 
and education. 
 
2. Alternative budget: taxes and revenues 
Tax Reform 
The main goal of the alternative budget for 2005 
is to show that it is possible to achieve a 
considerable reduction of the direct taxes and at 
the same time to maintain a balanced budget or 
even budget surplus. We propose the following 
reforms in the tax system: 
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• Decrease of the corporate tax to 10% (19.5% 
in 2004) 
• Decrease of the income t ax to 10% (12-29% 
in 2004) 
• Decrease of the social security tax to 10% 
(42.7% in 2004) 
• Abolition of the dividend tax (15% in 2004) 
Revenues in the consolidated budget 
The total revenues in the alternative budget, 
prepared by the Institute for Market Economics, 
are 14.4 billion levs1 or 34.5% of GDP (see table 
1 below). The revenues in the budget prepared 
by the government are about 16 billion levs, i.e. 
39% of GDP. These revenues, however, are 
underestimated by about 1 billion levs, therefore 
we assume that expected revenues are about 17 
billion levs, i.e. more than 41% of GDP (like in 
2004). Therefore the alternative budget seizes 
6.5% of GDP less resources from the economy 
than the budget of the government. 
--------- 
1 Under the currency board regime the exchange rate 
of the lev is fixed to the euro at 1.96 levs per 1 euro.
 
Table 1: Revenues in the alternative government budget, prepared by IME 
  
Government (budget 
draft) 
Institute for Market 
Economics 
  mln.levs % of GDP mln.levs % of GDP 
Total Revenues 16 067.0       38.9     14 436.2       34.5     
  1. Tax Revenues 13 093.9       31.7     11 272.2       26.9     
     Direct taxes  6 412.4       15.5     3 798.3         9.1     
        Corporate taxes  981.6         2.4     917.4         2.2     
        Income tax 1 216.6         2.9     1 259.8         3.0     
        Social security tax  4 214.2       10.2     1 621.1         3.9     
      Indirect taxes 6 341.9       15.3     7 105.0       17.0     
           VAT 4 185.0       10.1     4 426.9       10.6     
           Excises 1 916.8         4.6     2 344.1         5.6     
           Customs duties 240.1         0.6     334.0         0.8     
      Other taxes 341.6         0.8     369.0         0.9     
  2. Non-tax revenues 2 451.0         5.9     2 643.8         6.3     
  3. Aid 520.1         1.3     520.1         1.2     
Note: The differences between the budget, prepared by IME and the budget, prepared by the Government are due to 
the tax reforms proposed by IME and the fact that the revenues in the government budget for 2005 are 
underestimated. 
 
A. Taxation of labor 
As a result of the proposed tax cuts we expect 
several effects on the revenues from taxation of 
labor: 
• Lower incentives for hiding of incomes 
– a great part of the labor incomes are 
misreported because of the high rates of 
social security and income taxes. When the 
rates are lower, the incentives for 
misreporting are also lower and the tax base 
is increasing. 
• Increase of incomes – because of the 
economic growth and the additional 
economic activity and employment because 
of the lower taxes. 
• Increase of the companies’ profits – the 
social security burden is shared between the 
employer and employee (according to the 
elasticity of supply and demand of labor). 
We expect 30% of the social security tax 
cuts to go to the employer. 
The total effect of the above-mentioned effects 
is about 15% increase of the declared labor costs 
in 2005 as compared with 2004. Therefore the 
labor costs of employers are to reach about 16 
billion levs. 
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Table 2: Taxation of labor under 10% income 
and social security taxes 
2005 Levs 
Employers’ labor costs 16 210 829 483 
Social security tax 1 621 082 948 
Income after social security tax 14 589 746 534 
Non-taxable income (personal allowance) 3 354 000 000 
Taxable income 11 235 746 534 
Income tax 1 259 774 653 
Net income after taxes 13 329 971 881 
 
B. Taxation of profits 
The 10% corporate tax rate will have the 
following effects on the government revenues: 
• Social security effect – as mentioned, we 
expect 30% of the reduced social security 
taxation to go to the employers thus increasing 
their taxable profits. 
• Grey economy effect – corporate taxation is 
one of the most avoided (and evaded) taxes. The 
lower tax rates will diminish the incentives for 
tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
• Increase activity effect – lower taxes 
increase the economic activity and thus the tax 
base. 
As a result of these effects and because a part of 
the corporate taxes are paid for previous-year 
profits we expect a relatively small drop in the 
corporate tax revenues – about 10% drop. So the 
forecast for revenues from the corporate taxes is 
917 million levs. 
C. Revenues from excises 
The lower taxes lead to higher (net) take-home 
pay so Bulgarian citizens will be able to 
consume more goods, including goods that are 
taxed with excises. In addition, the higher 
economic activity needs more transportation, i.e. 
more fuels – taxed with excises. We expect this 
effect to amount to about 10% increase in the 
excise revenues. 
D. Revenues from Value-added tax (VAT) 
As far as the excises are a part of the taxable 
base for VAT, the additional excises lead to 
additional revenues from VAT. We expect 1% 
more revenues from VAT. 
E. Non-tax revenues 
They can be increased by privatization and 
public-private partnership. We expect 100 
million or 4% increase of these revenues as a 
result of these actions. 
 
3. Alternative budget: expenditures 
Total expenditures and budget balance 
The alternative budget has revenues of 13.8 
billion levs, i.e. less than 33% of GDP. The 
expenditures og the government budget are 
expected to reach about 40-41% of GDP in 2004 
so the alternative budget ensures a 7% cut in the 
expenditures as a share of GDP. 
We envisage a budget surplus of 730 million 
levs. This money is to be used to cover 
unexpected changes in the economic 
environment and realization of pension reform 
(capitalization of the pension system) and/or 
redemption of government debt (thus decreasing 
the interest payments of the budget). 
Government expenditures reform 
A. Salaries and social security taxes (for 
government employees) 
We propose at least a 3% cut of the number of 
public sector employees. Thus the personnel 
expenditures will decrease. On the other hand, 
the decrease of the social security and income 
taxes will increase the net wage of the public 
employees and at the same time it will decrease 
the expenditures of the budget (we divide the 
income and social security tax cut between the 
employees and the budget at 50:50 proportion). 
The institutions that decrease the staff by more 
than 3% can ensure additional increase of the 
salaries of their employees. 
B. Maintenance  
The decrease of the public sector staff combined 
with the sell of inefficient and unnecessary 
assets (buildings, cars, land, forests), an 
increased control over the expenditures and 
increased efficiency of the expenditures allows 
the expenditures to be frozen at the 2004 level. 
C. Defense and security 
The defense expenditures in Bulgaria are at a 
very high level as a share of GDP compared to 
most of European countries. Also, the army has 
lots of assets that are not needed and can be sold 
– the money obtained in this way can be used for 
financing part of the capital expenditures of the 
army. That allows for a 100 million levs 
reduction of the budget. Again, the decrease of 
the social security and income taxes will 
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increase the net wage of the public employees 
and at the same time it will decrease the 
expenditures of the budget by about 300 million 
levs (we divide the income and social security 
tax cut between the employees and the budget at 
50:50 proportion). 
D. Subsidies, credits and temporary financial 
aid 
The subsidies for loss-making companies and 
activities distort the market and hold resources 
in loss-making activities and thus impede the 
economic growth. We propose a 50% cut in the 
subsidies through reform and privatization of the 
state railways company, faster reform in the coal 
industry, increase of the efficiency of the state-
owned media, continuation of the healthcare 
reform, privatization of the hospitals etc. In 
addition, the Agriculture fund needs to start 
working on market principles and must be 
privatized eventually. 
E. Social expenditures 
In this article are included pensions, healthcare, 
social benefits, compensations etc. We propose 
elimination of the inefficient programs for 
meddling in the labor market that cost more than 
200 million levs.  
F. Capital expenditures 
Using privatization and/or public-private 
partnership for transferring infrastructure to the 
private sector and more competitive public 
procurement procedures will lead to a better 
quality of infrastructure and, at the same, time 
lower budget expenditures. 
G. Reserve for unexpected and urgent 
expenditures 
This article includes funds for natural calamities 
as well as funds for “structural reform”. The 
money for structural reform increase quite fast 
although no structural reform is being done. It 
seems that is a way for additional spending by 
the ministries. This additional spending is not 
justified, because the expenditures of the 
government institutions are too large and 
inefficient anyway. 
H. Interest expenditures 
The fiscal reserve and the proceeds from a faster 
privatization can be used for capitalization of the 
pension system and/or for payoff of the 
government debt (that will reduce the interest 
payments). 
 
Table 3: Expenditures of the alternative government budget, prepared by IME 
 2004 2005 - government 2005 - IME 
  Mln. levs % of GDP Mln. levs % of GDP Mln. levs % of GDP 
Total expenditures 14 645.9       38.6     16 262.6       39.3     13 757.7       32.8     
1. Non-interest expenditures 13 857.7       36.5     15 447.1       37.4     13 242.1       31.6     
 Current non-interest expenditures 12 303.7       32.4     13 402.6       32.4     11 678.9       27.9     
    Salaries and social security taxes 2230.9 5.9 2399.0 5.8 1962.0 4.7 
    Maintenance 2 299.9         6.1     2 613.2         6.3     2 299.9         5.5     
    Defense and security 1 527.1         4.0     1 632.2         3.9     1 232.2         2.9     
    Subsidies 683.2         1.8     746.5         1.8     373.3         0.9     
    Social expenditures 5 562.8       14.6     6 011.7       14.5     5 761.7       13.8     
     - Pensions 3 375.9         8.9     3 668.1         8.9     3 668.1         8.8     
     - social benefits, compensations 1 167.2         3.1     1 219.6         2.9     1 019.6         2.4     
     - healthcare fund 769.7         2.0     863.6         2.1     813.6         1.9     
     - other 249.9         0.7     260.4         0.6     260.4         0.6     
 Credits and temporary aid    100.0         0.2     -           -       
 Capital expenditures 1 330.2         3.5     1 594.9         3.9     1 463.2         3.5     
 Reserve 223.7         0.6     349.6         0.8     100.0         0.2     
2. Interest expenditures 788.2         2.1     815.6         2.0     515.6         1.2     
Surplus/deficit (+/-) - - -195.60 -0.5% 728.30 1.7% 
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4. Increase of wages because of the tax cuts 
The current taxation system taxes the labor costs 
of the employers with social security tax, then 
the gross wage is also taxed with social security 
tax and the remaining money are taxed with 
income tax. The total rate of the social security 
tax is 42.7% of the gross wage, and the income 
tax in 2004 is between 12 and 29% (according to 
the amount of income). 
As mentioned above, we propose tax cut, which 
will lower the social security tax rate to 10% and 
the income tax rate to 10% (therefore the 
combined tax on labor will be 19%). We expect 
70% of the social security tax cut to go to the 
employee and 30% to the employer. 
On figure 1 we can see the increase of the net 
salaries because of the introduction of 10% tax 
rates. The average increase of the net salaries is 
30%; the people with lowest and highest 
incomes will get about 25% increase of the net 
wage; the so-called middle class will receive 
about 35-45% increase of the net wage. The 
reason is that at the moment the middle class 
pays the highest tax rates. 
The net monthly income of an average family 
(with two working people) is about 470 levs 
after taxes. As a result of the social security and 
income tax cut to 10%, the net income of this 
family will reach more than 600 levs. The 
annual increase of the net income of the family 
will be 1700 levs. 
 
Figure 1: Increase of salaries because of the 10% tax rates 
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5. Alternative budget: 3-year budget reform 
Because of the forthcoming membership of 
Bulgaria in the European Union in 2007 and 
because of the need for further reduction of the 
tax burden and reforms in the budget 
expenditure, we propose the following reforms 
for 2006-2007: 
 
In 2006 
• Healthcare reform – private competitive 
health funds, privatization of the state health 
fund and hospitals 
• Pension reform – 8% of the gross salary go 
to a private pension fund (instead of the state 
pension fund) 
• Voucher system in the education 
• Continuing reduction of the public service 
staff 
• Continuing reduction of the subsidies for 
loss-making activities 
• Budget revenues – 29.9% of GDP, 
expenditures – 28.1% of GDP 
 
In 2007 
• Zero corporate tax (elimination of the 
taxation of profits) 
• Program budgeting 
• Adjustment of the excise tax rates according 
to the EU minimal requirements 
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• Continuing reduction of the public service 
staff 
• Continuing reduction of the subsidies for 
loss-making activities – EU starts to 
subsidize Bulgarian agriculture, the 
Bulgarian subsidies are entirely removed 
• Budget revenues – 28% of GDP, 
expenditures – 26.2% of GDP 
 
The proposed reforms will ensure a stable 
double-digit economic growth and 
corresponding rapid increase of the incomes of 
Bulgarian citizens. In addition, the reforms will 
increase the efficiency of the public spending 
and the quality of the public services, healthcare 
and education. 
 
 
Table 4: Alternative government budget, 2005-2007 
 2005 2006 2007 
  Mln. levs % of GDP Mln. levs % of GDP Mln. levs % of GDP 
Total Revenues 14 436.2 34.5 14 047.0 29.9 14 828.1 28.0 
  1. Tax Revenues 11 272.2 26.9 10 853.2 23.1 11 554.3 21.8 
     Direct taxes  3 798.3 9.1 2 438.4 5.2 1 981.4 3.7 
        Corporate taxes  917.4 2.2 1 027.5 2.2 387.0 0.7 
        Income tax 1 259.8 3.0 1 410.9 3.0 1 594.4 3.0 
        Social security tax  1 621.1 3.9 - - - - 
      Indirect taxes 7 105.0 17.0 8 034.7 17.1 9 172.9 17.3 
           VAT 4 426.9 10.6 4 958.1 10.6 5 602.7 10.6 
           Excises 2 344.1 5.6 2 742.6 5.8 3 236.3 6.1 
           Customs duties 334.0 0.8 334.0 0.7 334.0 0.6 
      Other taxes 369.0 0.9 380.0 0.8 400.0 0.8 
  2. Non-tax revenues 2 643.8 6.3 2 643.8 5.6 2 643.8 5.0 
  3. Aid 520.1 1.2 550.0 1.2 630.0 1.2 
Total expenditures 13 707.9 32.7 13 204.3 28.1 13 908.0 26.2 
1. Non-interest expenditures 13 192.3 31.5 12 788.7 27.3 13 508.0 25.5 
 Current non-interest expenditures 11 629.1 27.8 11 137.6 23.7 11 756.1 22.2 
    Salaries and social security taxes 1 962.0 4.7 1 962.0 4.2 2 089.5 3.9 
    Maintenance 2 299.9 5.5 2 437.9 5.2 2 596.4 4.9 
    Defense and security 1 232.2 2.9 1 306.1 2.8 1 391.0 2.6 
    Subsidies 373.3 0.9 186.6 0.4 93.3 0.2 
    Social expenditures 5 761.7 13.8 5 245.0 11.2 5 585.9 10.5 
     - Pensions 3 668.1 8.8 3 888.2 8.3 4 140.9 7.8 
     - social benefits, compensations 1 019.6 2.4 1 080.8 2.3 1 151.0 2.2 
     - healthcare fund 813.6 1.9 - - - - 
     - other 260.4 0.6 276.0 0.6 294.0 0.6 
 Credits and temporary aid - - - - - - 
 Capital expenditures 1 463.2 3.5 1 551.0 3.3 1 651.8 3.1 
 Reserve 100.0 0.2 100.0 0.2 100.0 0.2 
2. Interest expenditures 515.6 1.2 415.6 0.9 400.0 0.8 
Surplus/deficit (+/-) 728.3 1.7 842.7 1.8 920.2 1.7 
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20 arguments against minimum wage 
Dimitar Chobanov 
During the last two weeks, negotiations have 
been held between the Bulgarian government 
and the mission of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) concerning the increasing of the 
minimum wage in 2005 from 120 to 150 levs 
(from EUR 61.4 to 76.7). Purposed at this are 20 
arguments prepared by the Ministry for Labor 
and Social Policy (MLSP) experts who support 
that demand1. Here, an alternative position 
against minimum wage is presented trying to 
follow the same order as it is in the original 
document. 
1. Currently, minimum wage level is too high 
because it should be abolished. The presence 
of such a minimum impedes the free labor 
negotiations between the employer and 
employee. When such restrictions exist this 
distorts the information transmitted through 
labor price as these information signals for 
prices under the minimum cannot be 
transmitted to the business and to reflect the 
demand for and supply of labor. 
2. If minimum wage is abolished Bulgaria 
would enter the European Union with more 
flexible labor market because minimum 
wage is an impediment to its free 
functioning. 
3. Minimum wage is the only tool of the 
Ministry for Labor and Social Policy to 
affect the labor market and its abolishment 
would deprive it of discretional power. 
There is a great number and kinds of 
programs for people with low or zero 
income which are sufficient tool for 
influence. 
4. Minimum wage should not be used for 
social purposes. When an employer hires a 
worker he compares the marginal cost with 
the marginal revenue of it. The social 
meaning of this is that he/she could hire the 
worker and enable him to generate income 
but above some level it would not happen. 
Then, government should provide the entire 
size of the social minimum instead of giving 
some sort of additional payment in order to 
assure it. 
                                                 
1 The arguments are available in Bulgarian on the 
website of the ministry:  
http://www.mlsp.government.bg/bg/news/news.asp?n
ewsid=6846&catid=1 
5. Minimum wage and its growth create a 
higher risk of unemployment because when 
the marginal costs per worker rises and the 
marginal revenues are constant or fall then 
the employer will simply hire fewer workers 
and thus the employment will be smaller 
than the case when there are not such wage 
restrictions. 
6. Price of labor in Bulgaria is low and it is one 
of its few competitive advantages. When 
wages rise faster than the labor productivity, 
competitiveness is reduced leading to less 
foreign investment fewer jobs and lower 
living standards. 
7. That is why the only reasonable thing is to 
link wage and labor productivity i.e. when 
labor productivity does not rise then 
minimum wage does not rise either. 
8. Share of workers receiving minimum wage 
in the public sector is small but its increase 
would cause additional budget costs. This 
money is taken from the private sector 
where they could be used more efficiently 
and to add more value. Hence, the loss for 
the society would be greater. 
9. An minimum wage increase of 30 levs leads 
to 40 levs increase in employer’s costs i.e. 
there is a negative multiplication effect from 
it. 
10. Lower labor costs are one of the main 
factors in attracting investors because the 
infrastructure, property rights, regulations, 
relations with administration and the other 
indicators that influence the size of 
investment have rather negative effect. 
11. Bulgaria is competing with all other 
countries to attract investment because the 
degree of international integration is rising. 
Therefore, the conditions for making 
business among which is the minimum wage 
and its size should be compared not only 
with these in the EU but also in any other 
country. 
12. higher minimum wage would cost to the 
state budget “only 20 million levs” but the 
private sector costs would be much higher. 
Analyzing such a measure, we should take 
into account the whole effect of it not only 
its impact on the state budget. this effect 
includes cost-benefit analysis of adoption or 
amendment of particular regulation which 
can convincingly prove that the total 
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benefits for workers, businesses and budget 
would excess the costs. However, such 
measure would distort in greater extent the 
negotiation process between worker and 
employer would contribute for increased 
total loss for the society reflected in lower 
employment and fewer goods and services 
produced and hence lower income and living 
standards especially for low wage workers 
who would have to be advantaged of such 
activities. 
13. Following the above arguments, more funds 
would be taken from the real economy, 
which, in turn, would probably lead to loss 
of productive jobs. Of course, government 
could try to offset this loss by creating more 
inefficient public sector jobs. 
14. According to the MLSP estimates, these 
funds would equal 68 million levs which is 
not a small sum having in mind that these 
costs arise from an amendment of only one 
regulation. This money is burden not only to 
business but also to workers who, 
ultimately, pay the bill. However, related to 
the joining of Bulgaria to the EU 
amendments in existing or adoption of new 
regulations is imposed that additionally 
increase the burden on the business. In such 
case, economically unjustified change in 
regulations not related to the EU becomes 
even more harmful resulted in an 
accumulation of requirements that are harder 
and more expensive to fulfill. 
15. Higher minimum wage would not solve the 
spare jobs problem because if employers 
assessed that they could pay for a particular 
job less than 150 levs they cannot change 
their assessment because of the amendment 
in a government regulation. This job would 
not be occupied but just removed but this is 
not a way to solve the problem and, in fact, 
it creates even graver one. 
16. Higher minimum wage would contribute to 
larger size of shadow economy as some 
workers and employers would rather prefer 
to continue their relations with wage smaller 
than the minimum and this largely concerns 
the wages between 120 and 150 levs. 
17. Minimum wage is harmful for low 
productivity workers, for young people who 
wish to start working, for some disabled 
persons and, in fact, for the most vulnerable 
social groups. Such persons would be hired 
hardly and it becomes even harder with the 
higher minimum wage size. Thus, they 
cannot become experienced or achieve 
skills, which can be useful to increase their 
productivity and be more competitive on the 
labor market. 
18. Minimum assurance thresholds to a great 
extent have the same effect to the minimum 
wage as in many companies they are used as 
a compensation minimum and this is another 
reason for the minimum wage abolishment. 
19. The change in minimum wage would not 
affect positively employees with higher 
wage than 150 levs but, on the contrary, it is 
possible when cost for low productivity 
workers rises the number of high wage jobs 
to decrease. 
20. Workers with wage of 150 levs would 
receive the minimum and this can 
discourage them because the evaluation of 
their efforts would seem relatively lower. 
As a conclusion we can say that the only 
reasonable decision for the minimum wage is to 
be entirely abolished because of the significant 
negative effects that it causes on the whole 
economy and especially on the labor market.
 
 
How much does a square meter in Bulgaria 
worth? 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
Real estate hysteria in Bulgaria makes us 
wonder what their real price is. Everyone knows 
that this is the transaction price – when buyer 
and seller reach agreement and expect benefits 
from the deal.  
What are available sources of such information 
in Bulgaria? 
REMI Index – it is maintained by the National 
Property Association in Bulgaria (voluntary 
association of real estate brokers). The major 
problem with this index is that the data is 
supplied on voluntary basis, the index is released 
quarterly and it is too general (no details on type, 
age, infrastructure, properties of the real estate). 
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Despite this, the REMI index is still one of the 
good initiatives. 
Real estates Internet sites – several sites supply 
information on real estate prices but this is the 
asking price that can be misleading and cannot 
be used for in-depth analysis. This however can 
be the closest to market price that is available for 
the public at the moment. 
National Statistics Institute (NSI) - the prices 
quoted by this institute are much below the 
market. The main reason is that the notaries 
(major suppliers of data for NSI) possess 
underreported data on real estate transactions 
because participants avoid paying taxes. 
Real estate brokers – they possess all the 
information about property prices but are 
unwilling to provide it because it is considered 
as main competitive advantage.  
Who are the main users? 
Buyers/Sellers – they will benefit from this 
information the most because in this case they 
will be able to avoid speculations. Making such 
information publicly available will accelerate 
and facilitate market transactions. 
Banks, insurance companies, pension 
companies, etc. – at the moment they hire 
licensed appraisers to determine the RE market 
price. These appraisers in turn rely on RE 
brokers. In all cases the database that is 
compiled within one company is limited and 
does not represent the market as a whole. 
Real estate appraisers themselves – they use 
different methods to determine the property 
price and whatever they choose they always 
consult with real estate agencies (usually they 
have contract for exchange of information for a 
price). 
Analyzers and journalists – they monitor and 
analyze the market and try to forecast future 
developments. Therefore, they need reliable and 
up-to-date information. 
Local and foreign investors – they rely on such 
data so to assess future result of their 
investments. Since 2002, the Bulgarian real 
estate market is experiencing huge interest from 
abroad and availability of historic information is 
crucial for predicting future developments. 
Why then there is no such index in Bulgaria? 
The main reason is that participants in real estate 
market do not trust each other and hide 
information on parameters of the deals. Many of 
the active brokers are not properly licensed and 
operate semi-legally and therefore will use this 
information “for free”(without having obligation 
to provide such data). 
Another reason is the current property market 
situation – “the dominance of the seller”. Buyers 
do have expectations for continuing rising of 
prices in future and are ready to pay almost any 
price without bargaining. Among the winners 
from current situation are brokers and 
construction companies. Since they are among 
the main suppliers of this information and as 
long as they do not reach an agreement on 
conditions, the index cannot become real. 
Bearing in mind the size and features of RE 
market, an effective mechanism that will alarm 
market participants for upcoming negative 
development should be put in place. 
What can be done? 
We present two options below. 
1. Real estate market participants join forces, 
supply data, organize and produce real estate 
index. This can be done if most brokers commit 
themselves to supply regularly data. Certain 
methodology should be prepared so the 
authenticity, security and reliability of 
information be guaranteed for all suppliers; each 
participant can receive information only of he 
has provided such before; the model can allow 
for preparing of inquiries by different parameters 
– size, type of construction, year, etc. for each 
property. The maintenance of such index can be 
secured with introducing of fees for receiving 
data and selling of aggregate market analysis.  
Since most of real estate agencies are not willing 
to cooperate and join hands to make such index 
(at least at the moment) there is another option 
that is not the best solution but can accelerate the 
process and facilitate establishment of property 
market indicator. 
2. Banks and non-banking financial institutions 
are one of the most important participants and 
users of such index. The accumulated funds 
within them that are strongly correlated with real 
estate market development are a good reason to 
get involved in RE index establishment (or any 
sub-real estate index).  
Mortgage financing in Bulgaria is growing 
rapidly – interest rates are falling, borrowers 
requirements are eased, maturity is increasing 
and all this makes creation of similar index of 
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vital importance for future developments in 
mortgage market.  
 
A good idea is to create one single “internal” 
database 1 by all banks and/or non-bank financial 
institutions (or at least most of them) for all 
properties that have been mortgaged, insured, 
securitized or acquired as investment. Thus, a 
good database will be accumulated and creation 
and maintenance of real estate index can be 
facilitated in the future.  
Why is this easier to come true? 
First, banks are easier to be organized – they 
proved that by participating in the first private 
credit bureau establishment that will start 
operation very soon. The information that should 
be delivered is easy to be extracted from bank’s 
databases. 
Second, banks have the technical equipment for 
maintaining, supplying and organizing such 
information. Financial institutions can easy 
assign one person to perform administration 
functions in respect to such database. Most 
brokers are very small companies that often do 
operate semi-legally and do not have elementary 
equipment.   
Third, financial institutions often decide on such 
issues more easily than other companies – they 
can assess objectively the benefits of such 
system. 
Forth, financial risk is greater in a market where 
reliable information does not exist. 
Finally, “intelligence” of property prices by 
banks requires constant monitoring, funds and a 
certain degree of uncertainty.  
Of course, creation of one single index with RE 
agencies and brokers is always the best solution. 
 
------------- 
1 The Polish Banking Association is the initiator, 
organiser and administrator of similar database 
(Transaction cost database). The database is expected 
to be active soon. 
 
 
 
Study of Incentives, Characteristics and 
Strategies of Firms Operating ‘in the 
Shadows’ 
Martin Dimitrov 
 
IME conducted a survey of firms’ strategies and 
incentives to engage in informal activities and 
the resulting characteristics of company 
organization and strategy. The report is available 
at - link. By ‘informal’ economy we mean all the 
voluntary exchanges of labour, goods and 
services, which take place undetected by the 
government. IME and GfK in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Serbia and Montenegro did the field data 
collection via sociological survey (60 firms per 
country).   
Only part of individual’s economic life may be 
in the informal sector.  In all cases he or she 
faces the general (optimisation) problem, which 
involves the choice between registered and 
informal economy.  The government detection 
of a deal does not change the matter and essence 
of the deal itself.  However the choice between 
formal and informal has implications on the 
costs of the transaction.  Other thing equal, the 
parties will choose the form of transaction that 
implies the lowest transaction costs. 
Certain economic regulations create significant 
disincentives to operate formally.  As a result, 
some entrepreneurial ideas never reach the 
marketplace, some start informally, some are 
performed by otherwise formal company but 
without permission to engage in the particular 
activity, some are not complying with taxes 
and/or other liabilities to state.  
It is often the case that long-term strategies and 
market behaviour change when environment is 
one with proliferating informal activities.  The 
individual entrepreneur adjusts his/her own 
intentions to a situation in which his/her 
competitors pay no (or less) taxes, and when in 
most cases contracts are informal and can hardly 
be enforced by courts. 
Summary of findings on incentives: 
• There is a widespread perception that the 
informal economy is large and that it is an 
exogenous factor. If the share of the informal 
economy is substantial, then it takes somehow 
part in the formation of each player’s strategy. 
Thus it contributes to shaping the incentives that 
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direct the effort of almost any active person and 
form the business strategy of any enterprise; 
• Tax burden appears as the most significant 
factor conducive to informality; but the overall 
administrative burden appears to be much higher 
than its visible part such as taxation; 
• Evasion of labour tax is the most widespread 
form of tax evasion; 
• The rise in the tax burden diminishes 
incentives to engage in productive activity; 
• The incentives to engage in protective 
(rather than productive activity) must be 
attributed to both the seller and the buyer of 
labour. Thus the motivation for informality must 
be ascribed to a much wider population than just 
the business community; 
• Informal activities are one of the strategies 
firms choose to reduce transaction costs; the 
state contract enforcement mechanisms are 
considered unreliable by majority of firms; 
• There are major implications from operating 
informally on the manager- labour relationship, 
on competitiveness and company growth; 
 
The overview of the study findings, as well as 
numerous other studies of the topic allows us to 
summarize the following common business 
strategies for SEE: 
• In an environment of overwhelming 
informality firms trade with known partners and 
do not recourse to official contract enforcement 
institutions; 
• Vertical integration emerge as a mean to 
reduce the cost of transacting; 
• Owners usually dominate company 
structures and impose informal intra-
organizational labor relations, thus preventing 
the utilization of the competitive and formal 
market for specialized labor; 
• In certain activities (non-specialized labor, 
mass commodities, etc.) staying informal and 
avoiding taxes is the dominant competitive 
strategy to reduce costs, and therefore – selling 
price; thus informality in these sectors is 
mutually-generating; 
• In markets of direct, simple and self-
enforcing transactions (they prevail on the 
Balkans as shown by various studies of post-
communist transition) a firm can grow in the 
shadow sector without facing the opportunity 
cost of lacking access to formal institutions; 
• The majority of the unreported activity takes 
place in the form of partial-informality, i.e. the 
businesses comply at least with some of the 
regulations, pay some of the taxes due, register 
their labour contracts, etc; 
Policy Recommendations 
Above findings could be addressed through - 
first of all - national policy mixes.  The tacit 
mission of our project, however, is to 
recommend policy measures that might be 
applied in the context of EU integration 
(accession, regional cooperation and 
stabilization and accession process).   
The recommendations below attempt to 
distinguish national and EU policies.  Depending 
on the context, the problem could stem from the 
fact there is inefficient EU approach to 
challenges in different areas.  
1) Tax and quasi-tax, including administrative, 
burdens should be lowered and simplified.  Due 
to the relative ease with which economic agents 
can cross over to the unofficial economy and the 
high tax, quasi tax and administrative burden, it 
appears that SEE countries fall into the negative 
sloping segment of the Laffer curve – that is 
higher tax rates may be resulting in lower tax 
revenues.  On the contrary, more moderate and 
lower tax rates may result in a significant 
increase in the tax base.  Tax-“harmonization” 
comments and “requirements” referring to lower 
direct taxation in new (2004) members-states do 
not take into account above impacts and do not 
seem justified. 
• Regarding taxes, the policy that helps 
eliminating incentives to informality is reduction 
and simplification of direct taxes, including 
mandatory social welfare contributions.  It 
should include, besides tax cuts, unification of 
national treatment, elimination of special 
exemptions and preferences.  Surveyed countries 
follow the overall 2004-accession pattern to 
lower and make flatter direct taxes. 
• Regarding quasi-taxes (i.e. costs of dealing 
with the government, compliance costs and 
administrative entry barriers) there are principle 
policies related to facilitation of entry and 
business registration, separation of 
inspections/controls from commencing 
activities, reduction of licences and permits, 
depersonalisation of thus reformed 
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administrative process – use of one stop shops 
and e-government. 
2) Transposition of the acquis and the 
stabilization and association process (SAP) 
result in new legislation and regulations.  They 
should take into account the preparedness of 
local businesses and citizenry to comply and the 
capacity of national administrations to enforce 
new rules.  This and other studies show that a 
significant incentive for informal economic 
activities are regulations that are too restrictive 
or costly, and at the same time, not uniformly 
applied to all businesses. 
• A step in this direction is the introduction of 
systematic Regulation Impact Analysis (RIA), 
be it in the form of cost efficiency and/or cost 
benefit analysis.  The processes of both 
economic transition and EU accession involve 
adoption and implementation of an enormous 
amount of new legislation and regulations.  An 
important option is the introduction 
(institutionalisation within a separate unit or 
within a ministry) of a RIA Unit for systematic 
preliminary assessments ensuring large public 
participation (compulsory consultation 
procedures) and public scrutiny (publication on 
Internet, other media). 
EU does not have a unified approach to this 
challenge; the member states vary in their 
accountability and government-in-the-sunshine 
experience.  Accession countries, with a relative 
success, apply some version of RIA in an 
attempt to keep costs under control.  Similar 
policies of future members (Bulgaria and 
Romania, and SAP countries) must be welcome 
and encouraged.  
3) Economic openness.  State policies should 
target openness including free movement of 
goods, services, capital, people and improving 
accountability of procedures (e.g. public 
procurement) as a precondition for lengthening 
production processes and increasing value added 
instead of imposing protectionist measures. 
Integration in international value-added chains 
and corporate structures leads to formalization of 
business activity.  Therefore, national policies 
should allow for free penetration and 
cooperation of capital in a larger economic 
space, thus providing opportunities for 
businesses to expand. Economic openness 
embraces liberalization. 
• The argument favouring radical versus 
gradual/partial economic liberalization is even 
stronger in settings like SEE with a large 
unofficial economy. The liberalization effort has 
to be sufficiently substantial so as to lower 
expected official costs of doing business to a 
level below those of operating unofficially. 
4) Accountable provision and financing of 
public services.  This may include two policy 
options: a) introduction of program-oriented 
budgeting in public spending and b) 
decentralization of spending and taxing 
decisions, i.e. fiscal decentralization.  
• The present prevalence of centralized and 
historic-based public finance is both non-
transparent and not focused on providing public 
services used and demanded by most of the 
business community.  Taxes, quasi-taxes and all 
other fees paid by citizens should therefore be 
closely related to specific public services in 
transparent and accountable manner.  
• Decentralization, understood as 
accountability of those who collect and spend 
taxes, will increase the decision-making powers 
of individual business people who will then be 
able to decide how much to pay through taxes 
and fees and how to direct the public funds to 
serve their interest in the best manner. 
5) Governments should put more emphasis on 
improving enforcement of existing regulations 
rather than increasing the number of laws and 
regulations to be enforced.  
• At the same time, there is a natural tendency 
for bureaucrats to expand their agencies in both 
authority and resources. Therefore governments 
should specifically address this problem and 
restrict proliferation of administrative units and 
regulations.  Otherwise, the above-mentioned 
process of over-regulation leads to hypertrophy 
of laws and erosion of the rule of law curable 
through codification, deregulation and 
simplification. 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
 
Economic Policy Review, issue 29, November - December 2004  - 13 - 
Minister of Finance: In Defence of 
Libertarianism and Zero Tax Rate 
 
 
Academic address of Minister Milen Veltchev 
on “The Inequality of Freedom, and the Lack 
of Liberty in Equity” 
 
Mr. President, 
Dear Lecturers and Students, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Please, allow me to express my gratitude to you 
all for the high honour of conferring on me 
today the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the 
University of National and World Economy. I 
would like to thank sincerely the Academic 
Council of UNWE for the attention shown to 
one of their alumnus – proud, happy and 
sincerely moved by the opportunity to receive 
the most precious recognition for his work and 
achievements by his own university. Please, 
allow me to share with you that this moment is 
even happier for me also due to the fact that the 
title conferred on me is also recognition for the 
work of all adherents, colleagues, professionals 
without whom the achievements that have 
attracted your attention would not have been 
possible. And let me add that this high honour I 
owe to any one of us, who have contributed the 
successes of our country to become visible, the 
achievements real and the progress – material. 
Today I would like to defend before you an idea 
that inspires me, an idea in which I believe; a 
modern and at the same time old philosophy 
about freedom, about the building of a free civil 
society of economic progress and prosperity, a 
society which our country is aiming at. I am 
speaking about libertarianism. 
In a sense, there have always been only two key 
concepts in all political philosophies: liberty and 
power. The first acknowledges the right of the 
individual to govern his own destiny by 
following his views, beliefs, attitudes and 
desires, providing he respects the same rights of 
the others. The second, figuratively said, 
“exports” and imposes its own idea about good 
and right, not recognizing the right of the 
individual to err even towards himself, but most 
of all towards the right direction drawn by the 
power. Of course, it is no surprise, that the 
philosophy of power has usually been more 
attractive for those, who are in the power. 
The philosophy of freedom has had many 
names. It can be found in ancient Eastern 
thought; it provoked the minds of the Greek 
civilization; it is defended by Christianity. The 
philosophy of freedom changes its faces, its 
names, its heralds down the ages in order to 
reach us in its constant nature – respect for the 
individual and confidence in the ability of 
ordinary people to make wise decisions about 
their own lives. 
Libertarianism, as the name itself suggests, is 
belief in that every person owns his own life and 
property and has the right to choose what to do 
with them as long as he respects the same right 
with regard to others. Hence, it is evident that 
libertarians consider the individual to be the 
main unit of social analysis – it is the individuals 
that make the decisions, but it is also them who 
"own up" to their acts, that is, that they take 
responsibility for what they do. Since the 
individuals are moral subjects they have the 
right to be protected in their lives, freedom and 
property. And these rights are not a gift from the 
state or society, but on the contrary, they are 
inherent to the nature of human beings. It is no 
chance that one of the most famous books of all 
times which has played an enormous role for the 
development of Western civilization – The 
Social Contract by Jean Jacques Rousseau 
begins with the following proclamation: “Man is 
born free; and everywhere he is in chains”. This 
concept preordains the position of libertarian 
philosophy with regard to the state, namely that 
its role should be brought to that of a protector 
of the primary human rights, where they may be 
violated, but that should be done with minimum 
intervention in the life of the individual in order 
not to infringe upon his right to autonomy. The 
right to precisely that freedom, where the 
individual is unrestricted in his creative and 
productive impulses, the freedom whereby the 
individual is strong to interact with others, to 
make a choice, to err and to bear the 
consequences of his errors, but mainly to create 
goods, a future and a better life for himself and 
as logical result – for the society. 
Where in the broad political spectrum is the 
place of libertarianism – whether next to the left 
idea of the social state or closer to the market 
concept of the right wing? Some say that 
libertarianism is neither left nor right if we go by 
the definitions of contemporary politics. Others 
think that it combines in an appropriate manner 
the best in the two antipodes, to step, on the one 
hand, on the left position of self-government as 
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tolerance towards the others, and on the other, 
on the right one – of responsible economic 
behaviour. And the combination of these two 
bases leads to social harmony and material 
prosperity. Third paraphrase this concept and, by 
way of a joke, maintain that libertarians are right 
in economic matters and left – in the social ones. 
Today I am not addressing you to electioneer for 
the ruling coalition NMSS – MRF. I think 
though that the sharply cut down tax rates during 
the past years speak of more than just a 
linguistic coincidence between libertarianism 
and the liberal character of our two political 
parties. 
Libertarianism, however, is not only a political 
philosophy. It is an idea, conception, intuition, 
what liberty is in itself, therefore it is fight for 
the right of free choice and tolerance in all 
spheres of our lives. We will find the libertarian 
idea in the efforts to establish religious 
tolerance, in the abolitionist movement in the 
USA, in the fight for non-discrimination of 
various groups of people. 
I hope that you will forgive me for being 
pragmatic as a man of finance, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, which makes me choose only one of 
these spheres and just talk about some of the 
basic economic views of libertarianism. In order 
to get ourselves near to the economic vision of 
the philosophy of freedom, I would like to share 
with you two fundamental principles which 
undoubtedly are the primary characteristics and 
engines of free economy. They are simple, 
evident and irrefutable. Let us start with the first 
one that can be presented as follows: 
“Free people are not equal and equal people are 
not free.” 
I am quick to clarify which equality I actually 
mean. Of course I do not mean equality before 
the law or political liberty; it is not about 
politically free people who are not equal before 
the law. „He who confuses political liberty with 
freedom and political equality with similarity 
has never thought for five minutes about either”, 
G.B. Shaw said on a similar occasion. 
What it is actually all about is economic equality 
– income and economic status, in other words all 
we can offer and acquire on the free market. 
In order to better explain this principle, let us 
divide it into two and start with “Free people are 
not equal”. I suppose you will agree that when 
people are free to be themselves, to command 
their fortune, to freely make efforts to improve 
their well-being and that of their families, the 
market outcome could not be equal income for 
everyone. Since indisputably everyone of us is a 
unique human being, different from any other 
that has ever existed, why should we expect that 
our actions and market interrelations would yield 
equal results? We all have different gifts, talents, 
skills. Some of us have more or more highly 
esteemed gifts than others have. Sometimes we 
find our true vocation not until a later stage of 
our lives. What is important is to be free to seek 
for it. 
We are also different in the extent of our 
entrepreneurship, in our preparedness to work, in 
our efforts we devote to it, we are also different 
in our ability to save. I would bet that if 
someone managed to make us all equal in 
income and prosperity overnight by just clicking 
their fingers, this time tomorrow we would all be 
different again for some of us would have saved 
part of their money while others would have 
spent it all. 
All this makes us conclude quite logically that if 
people are free to be themselves, they could not 
be economically equal. 
That is why, I cannot agree with the proposition 
that transition in Bulgaria will end only after 
everybody will have become rich and started 
living like the average European. There is no 
average European. This concept groundlessly 
conceals the huge abyss between the poor 
unemployed and homeless people and the 
inconceivably wealthy aristocrats of an England, 
for instance. We do not state that since 30% of 
Americans do not have health insurance, the 
USA have not yet come out of transition, do we? 
As far as the second part of this principle is 
concerned, namely that “equal people are not 
free”, I would suggest thinking together for a 
moment and trying to find a country where 
people are really economically equal. If you 
have already managed to think about such a 
country, let me convince you that people in that 
country are not free at all. Why? Frankly 
speaking, the only way to make the income and 
well-being equal in a given society is to suppress 
the capabilities of the more enterprising ones; to 
impede their self-development and becoming 
well-off, to artificially retain minority’s 
development, for, alas, highly gifted people are 
always a minority, so that we can make their 
speed equal to that of the slower, less active 
majority. In other words, the only way is to 
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literally use power to make the talented ones 
obey orders like: Do not do well! Do not work 
more and better than the others! Do not serve 
better than your competitors! Do not save and do 
not spend more reasonably than the others! I 
hope that none of us would like to live in such a 
society especially after the unlucky attempts of 
the communist regime to unify us all by 
frequently using similar methods of power. 
Let me give another example from the 
international tax practice. Without going into the 
specifics of the tax laws, which have just been 
voted by the Bulgarian Parliament, I would like 
to note that the libertarian idea of non-
intervention of state and of free market relations 
envisages low tax rates that are to promote 
production and business. Of course, we should 
not forget that what our government is also 
striving at is a smooth phased process. What I 
wanted to share with you is concerning the high 
taxes and in particular – the highly segmented 
bracket for personal income taxation 
traditionally proposed by the left political forces. 
When we raised the salaries in the budget sphere 
this summer it turned out that many of the 
employees were not satisfied. And it is quite 
natural. It was secret for no one that the 
increased income of many of them passed to the 
next stage of the tax bracket, which 
automatically meant higher percent of income 
tax. That is to say, many people asked 
themselves the question: “What do I need a 
higher salary for when my real income grows 
more slowly?” We know that payment may be 
increased for various reasons – individual 
approach of the employer when the employee 
works well, improvement of qualification, etc. 
What stimulus would you have to improve the 
quality of your work or your skills if your 
payment would not actually increase? Shouldn’t 
people strive to work more and better in order to 
increase their wealth? And should they be 
sanctioned in this striving of theirs? Should we 
aim at relatively standardizing people in their 
payment regardless of the different efforts, time 
and skills they commit to their work. The tax 
legislation in countries like the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Ireland where the personal 
income tax bracket has not more than 3 stages 
affirms this conclusion. 
Now I would like to avail of the opportunity to 
express a position that in the next days may be 
considered brave by the well-wishers and 
reckless – by the ill-wishers. 
It is a challenge for me to be the first Finance 
Minister who supports the recent appeal of Prof. 
Victoria Curzon Price, President of the Mont 
Pelerin Society, to globally abolish the corporate 
income tax. 
I have mentioned above that I would dwell on 
two basic principles of the economic philosophy 
of libertarianism. So far, I have dwelled on the 
principle of free inequality and lack of liberty in 
equity. And the other principle is: 
“People take care of what is their own. What 
belongs in common to the most people is 
accorded the least care: they take thought for 
their own things above all, and less about things 
common.” 
This principle underlies the “magic effect” of 
private property. It also gives a key explanation 
of the failure of socialist economies in the world. 
In the Soviet Union, and in Bulgaria before 
1989, the authorities proclaimed supremacy of 
central planning and public property. They 
believed that private property was selfish and 
non-productive and tried to convince us that 
under the competent management of the central 
government the resources would be used for the 
general welfare. The food of the farmer became 
“food of the people” and people were hungry. 
The factory of the entrepreneur became “factory 
of the people” and started manufacturing goods 
that could not be sold in any foreign market. 
And if you believe that you can equally well 
take care of any property I would advise you to 
go and live in the house of someone else and 
drive his car for a month. I guarantee that neither 
the house, nor the car would look in the same 
way as your own do after the same period of 
time. 
That is why the concept that people are more 
assiduous and use the resources more wisely if 
the ownership over the property is private is a 
working one. 
Another benefit of the private property, which is 
not so much economically obvious, is that it 
allocates power. When a subject like the state 
owns the whole property individuals have no 
protection against its will. The institution of the 
private property allows many people to find their 
own place where to be protected from the hostile 
actions of either other people or the state. 
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Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Liberal and libertarian concepts actually have 
their long tradition in Bulgaria, too. Immediately 
after the liberation of our country in 1878 many 
of the builders of the Third Bulgarian State 
adopted this philosophy and this approach to the 
government of society, economy and state. And 
it is quite logical – great number of them had 
been active participants in the national liberation 
struggles. In their view the concept that each 
person has an inherent right to existence, 
freedom and property was a natural continuation 
of their ambitions and dreams to see their mother 
land an independent and prosperous state. 
Today, after a long and difficult period of 
isolation and totalitarianism, after another 
equally difficult and long period of transition, a 
significant part of the Bulgarian society sees 
again in these ideas a chance for a more 
successful and accelerated development of the 
country. Development which is based on 
transparency in politics, on private property, low 
taxes, free markets and competition in economy, 
on decentralization of power, on people’s free 
choice. Because freedom is no luxury. It is much 
more than a lucky coincidence or a concept we 
defend by sheer force of habit. Freedom is the 
driving force behind everything that happens in 
us, with us and through us. Let’s live in this 
freedom to be ourselves and to remain tolerant to 
others. Or as Doctor Kenneth Bisson, member of 
the American Libertarian Party, jokes: 
“Libertarianism is what your mom taught you: 
behave yourself and don't hit your sister”. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I am glad I had the opportunity to share these 
ideas with you today and I would once again like 
to thank you for the high honour you bestowed 
on me. 
Thank you for your attention 
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